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INTRODUCTION 
There has been a great deal of discussion in recent years 
about liberalizing agricultural trade and support policies in 
the United States, the European Cormlunity and Japan . Changes 
in agricultural support levels in industrial countries will 
affect agriculture in almost every country of the world. How 
agriculture in the less developed countries will be influenced 
is still unclear. There have been several studies done to try 
to determine the effect of trade liberalization on less 
developed countries. This paper will compare, contrast and 
analyze five multiconmodity, partial equilibrium models 
developed to determine the results of agricultural trade 
liberalization on developing countries. 
The first section will give a general overview of current 
agricultural policies in less developed countries and the 
outlook for prices of agricultural goods in the future . The 
next section will discuss the general effects of agricultural 
trade liberalization on the supply, demand and prices of 
agricultural goods . 
The third section, the analysis of studies, makes up the 
bulk of the paper. In this section, five models designed to 
determine the effects of agricultural trade liberalization are 
compared. In an effort to see if any clear consensus exists, 
I will examine the methodologies, the data and the results. 
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What is learned from the third section is then used to 
determine the effects of agricultural trade liberalization on 
developing countries in the fourth section. 
some concluding remarks. 
Lastly , there are 
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CURRENT SITUATION 
Unlike agricultural policies in the industrialized 
countries, the agricultural policies in developing countries 
generally benefit consumers over producers. Many less 
developed countries (LDCs), keep consumer prices artificially 
low as a subsidy to the manufacturing and urban secto rs . 
These governments also often rely on export taxes for 
significant amounts of revenue. Farmers in less developed 
countries often must sell their output to agricultural 
marketing boards which act as monopscnists, leaving producers 
no alternative but to take whatever price is given. 
There are also indirect taxes on farmers. An overvalued 
exchange rate distorts the domestic prices of imports and 
exports. Imports are cheaper in terms of the domestic 
currency while the domestic price of exports is lower. If the 
overva lued domestic unit were exchanged at the rate of $1 
equals 5 units (and l unit equals 20 cents), then $100 worth 
of goods so ld on the world market would convert to 500 units . 
However, if the exchange rate were devalued to $1 equals 10 
units (or 1 unit equals 10 cents), then that same bundle of 
goods would earn the farmer 1,000 units. 
Moreover, many LDCs have policies of import substitution, 
giving the manufacturing sector high levels of trade 
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protec tion at a / cost to agri c ulture. Import s ub s titution 
refers to poli c ies protecting domestic indus tries from 
for e ign c ompetition. Mo s t often these poli cies we re b eg un to 
prot ect an infant industry. Inputs for th e industr y may b e 
s ubsidized while tariff s or quota s are us e d to r es tri c t trade 
in th e finish ed produc t. While the policies may have been 
instituted to help a ne w industr y , far too often the 
prot ec tion is never removed. Mor eo ve r , f ood pri ces ar e o ften 
subsidized to allow the manufacturi ng sec tor to keep wag es 
low. 
Suc h poli c ies a c t a s di s incentives for the a g ri c ultural 
sec tor. Resources ar e drawn to the prot ec ted indus trie s from 
the agri c ultural sector. High e r prices o f manufa c tur ed goods 
re s ulting from prot ec tion di s tort th e r e lativ e pri ces o f 
agricultural goods. Governme nts often keep co n s ume r fo od 
pri ces low by keeping produce r pri ces low. Th ese poli cies 
instituted to h e lp a fledgling indu s trial sector have harme d 
th e agricultural sector. 
There i s discrimination within th e agricultural sec t o r as 
we ll . Goods s u c h as wheat, co rn and ri ce, whi c h o ft e n must be 
imported, ar e more likely to hav e some kind of domes ti c 
s upport than export ed produ c t s lik e c off ee o r cocoa bea ns. 
Su c h meas ur es ha ve a l so di sco urag ed the production o f past 
staples s uch as root s and tub e r s and ot her coar se grains, like 
mill et and barl ey . Of th e f o rt y - two poorest c ountri es 
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according to the World Bank, 25 support either wheat, rice or 
corn while only 12 support tropical products such as sugar, 
coffee, tea or cocoa beans.I 
In an effort to explain the actual magnitude of 
agricultural disincentives, Anne Krueger, Maurice Schiff and 
Alberto Valdes looked at the policies affecting farmers in 
developing countries. They considered both the direct 
policies (price supports, fertilizer subsidies, and export 
taxes) and indirect policies (exchange rate and protection of 
the manufacturing sector). They looked at eighteen developing 
countries between 1975 and 1984. What they discovered was 
that the negative macroeconomic indirect effect greatly 
outweighed any positive direct effect for producers. 
In measuring the effect of direct interventions, the 
authors measured the difference between the producers price 
and the border price. The effect of indirect policies was 
more complicated. It consisted of three parts: "first, the 
depreciation of the real exchange rate required for the 
elimination of the nonsustainable part of the current account 
deficit; second, the depreciation of the real exchange rate 
due to the removal of trade interventions; and third, the 
increase in the price of agricultural tradable products 
1. FAO, Statistics on Agricultural Support Price 1978 -
1987.(Rome: FAO, 1989). 
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relative to nonagricultural tradables due to the removal of 
trade policy interventions, whi c h mainly protect industry". 2 
The results, displayed in tables 1 and 2, show that 
producers in developing countries have disin c entives far 
larger than previously thought. 
Several things need to be noted from these tables . 
First, domestic producers who grow wheat, rice or corn,who 
compete with imported foodstuffs , are o ften subsidized by 
direct policies, while those growing exported agricultural 
goods are more often taxed . Domesti c policies within the 
agricultural sector favor import competing products over 
exported goods. 
But more importantly, the indirect macroeconomic policies 
of these countries have a larger effect on agricultural prices 
than the direct policies. On average, price s of agricultural 
goods are almost 30% lower due t o exchange rate policie s and 
poli cies protecting the industrial sector. Several s tudies 
analyzed in this paper use the estimates of Krueger, Schiff 
and Valdes in modeling agricultural protecti o n in developing 
countries. As will be shown, th e e ffe ct on pri ces and output 
from agricultural liberalization varies greatly depending upon 
whether LDCs also liberalize their domestic policies and 
2. Anne 0. Krueger, Mauric e Schiff and Alb e rto Valdes, 
"Agricultural Incentive in Developing Countries: Mea s uring the 
Effect of Sectoral and Economywide Policies," The World Bank 
Economi c Review 2 (Sep tember, 1988): 259. 
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Table 1. Direct, indirect, and total nominal protec tion 
rates for exported produc t s, 19 8 0 - 84. (percent) 
country product direct indirec t total 
Argentina wheat - 13 - 37 -50 
Brazil soybeans - 19 - 14 - 33 
Chile grapes 0 - 7 - 7 
Colombia coffee - 32 -19 - 51 
Cote d'Ivoire cocoa -2 1 - 26 - 47 
Dominican Rep . coffee - 32 - 19 -5 1 
Egypt cotton - 22 - 14 - 36 
Chana cocoa 34 - 89 - 55 
Malaysia rubber - 18 - 10 - 28 
Pakistan c otton - 7 - 35 - 42 
Portugal tomatoes 17 -13 4 
Sri Lanka rubb e r - 31 - 31 - 62 
Thailand rice - 15 - 19 -34 
Turke y Tobacco - 28 - 35 - 63 
Zambia Tobac co 7 - 57 -5 0 
average - 1 1 - 29 - 40 
Sour ce: Krueger, Sc hiff and Valde s 
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Table 2. Direct, indirect, and total nominal protection 
rate s for imported food produ c t s, 1980 - 84. 
(percent) 
countr y product direct indirec t total 
Brazil wheat - 7 - 14 - 21 
Chile wheat 9 - 7 2 
Colombia wheat 9 - 34 - 25 
Cote d'Ivoire rice 16 - 26 - 10 
Dominican Rep. rice 26 - 19 7 
Egypt wheat -21 - 14 - 35 
Chana rice 118 - 89 29 
Korea rice 86 - 12 74 
Malaysia rice 68 - 10 58 
Mor occo wheat 0 - 8 - 8 
Pakistan wheat -21 - 35 - 56 
Philippines corn 26 - 28 - 2 
Portugal wheat 26 - 13 l 3 
Sri Lanka ri ce 1 1 - 31 -20 
Turkey wh eat - 3 - 35 -38 
Zambia co rn - 9 -57 - 66 
Average 2 l - 27 - 6 
Sour ce : Krueger, Schiff and Valdes, 1988. 
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whether these significant indirect effects are taken into 
account. 
Thus, produ ce rs in developing c ountries receive less than 
the world price for their goods. If current agricultural 
policies continue, the forecast is for lower world prices in 
the near term with only moderate increases, if any , in the 
longer term. Table 3 shows the price fore c asts made by the 
Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute (FAPRI) , for 
wheat and corn. 
Lower food prices have also been forecast by other 
organizations . The World Bank estimates that 1995 food pri ces 
will be 60% of 1980 - 82 levels. USDA estimates of grain and 
soybean prices for the year 2000 are 70% of 1980 - 82 level s. 
Estimates done by Kym Anderson and Rodney Tyers, in a study 
discussed later, have real international food prices be tween 
54% and 69% of 1980 - 82 prices depending on price transmission 
assumptions. 
At first glance , lower world agricultural prices might 
appear to benefit les s developed countries. They would lower 
their import costs and help keep co nsumer prices down. 
Unfortunately, however, lower agri c ultural pri ces could 
further hinder developme nt in those countries. Most 
economists now realize that economic development must begin 
with gr owth and dev e lopme nt in the agricultural s e c tor . 
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Table 3. Forecasted pr ices for wheat and corn 
$ / MT 89 / 90 90 / 91 91 / 92 92 / 93 93 / 94 93-97 
CORN 
FAPRI '89 
nominal 98 95 95 97 97 105 
real ($1980) 65 61 57 56 54 53 
FAPRI '9 1 
US corn 1 1 0 104 1 10 104 108 109 
(FOB Gulf) 
world corn 129 1 1 7 124 11 7 1 2 1 122 
(CIF Rotterdam) 
WHEAT 
FAPRI '89 
nominal 158 142 136 147 147 160 
real ($1980) 105 90 82 84 81 81 
FAPRI '91 
US wheat 165 120 128 144 150 148 
(FOB Gu 1 f) 
world wheat 182 1 4 1 150 170 177 175 
(CIF Rotterdam) 
Source: FAPR I I World Agri c ultural Outlook, 1989 and 1991. 
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Higher corrmodity prices will lead to increased domesti c 
production. This will lead to higher rural incomes through 
both conmodity prices and increased employment. In the 
developing countries, the majority of the people live in the 
rural sector, including the majority of the poor. An increase 
in rural income not only improves income distribution 
throughout the country but creates demand for other goods , 
both manufactured and agricultural goods. A healthy and 
productive rural sector assists the development of the rest of 
the economy. 
Low world prices are also not helpful to industrialized 
countries that spend millions of dollars supporting their 
farmers. There is growing discontent over the cost of farm 
programs. Moreover, farmers are unhappy about the policies in 
other countries which they feel are unfair. 
A patchwork of subsidies, tariff walls and 
price guarantees is straining every 
nation's treasury, making a nonsense of 
world trade and still not providing a 
decent living for many farmers.3 
In order to address some of these problems, liberalizing 
agricultural trade is being encouraged. This will enable 
farmers to compete on more equal footing and save governments 
3. "The Road Down Subsidy Mountain," The Economist 307 (May 
21, 1988): 15. 
1 2 
money. It will also alter the supply, demand, and prices of 
agricultural goods. 
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GENERAL EFFECTS OF TRADE LIBERALIZATION 
If the agricultural policies in the de ve loped countries 
were liberalized, it is generall y believed that world 
agricultural prices for temperat e good s would rise. Removing 
the protection farmer s in the U. S., the European Community and 
Japan enjoy would lower the prices these produ ce rs receive. 
That would result in decreased output from these countries. 
This lower supply would ca use the world prices of these 
protected goods to rise. 
Moreover, Japanese and European co nsume rs ar e fa ced with 
very high food prices in order to support their farm programs . 
According to one study, in 1980-82, consumer s in Western 
Europe were paying 50% more than world pri ces for agricultural 
goods while those in Japan faced food pri ces that were 150% 
above the international level.4 Liberalization would allow 
these prices to fall, resulting in more demand for 
agricultural goods and causing world agri c ultural prices t o 
increase further . 
While th e pri ce of temperat e good s would ri se , the ef fe c t 
of liberalization on the pri ces of tropi c al agricultural 
produ c ts is un c lear . Sugar pri ces would inc rease be c au se many 
4. Rod Tye r s and Kym Anderson, "Liberalizing OECD 
Agricultural Policies in the Urugua y Round: Effects on Trade and 
Welfare," Journal of Agri c ultural Eco nomi cs 39 (May, 1988): 202. 
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industrialized countries protect their sugar producers. 
However, most developed countries don't have protection on 
other tropical goods. The result of agricultural 
liberalization on coffee, tea and cocoa beans would depend on 
the actions of the developing countries. If the disincentives 
facing these products were removed, their prices would rise 
and production would increase . How high prices would rise and 
how much production would increase in not known . However , if 
the domestic policies in these countries remain intact, the 
prices of tropical goods would change very little . 
Other effects of a liberalization of agricultural 
policies in OECD countries would be a shrinking of the farm 
sectors in the industrialized countries. With lower prices 
and less output, fewer resources would be required in the 
agricultural sectors. Economically , there would be a more 
efficient use of resources . 
The notion of liberalizing agricultural trade refers to 
removing policies that alter the price of traded agricultural 
goods. These are usually policies that encourage production 
through a guarantee of a certain price or that affect trade 
through tariffs, quotas or export subsidies. Farmers in the 
industrialized countries could still receive support as long 
as it was not trade distorting. Support based on income 
rather than production would be allowed. Support based on 
only part of production, an amount small enough to allow 
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market prices to determine total production is another 
possibility. Thus, the size of the farm sector after 
liberalization would be determined by the kind of support 
given farmers. 
Developing countries also insulate their farmers fr om 
world prices. This insulation is measured by price 
transmission elasticities. If a country sets its domestic 
price and c ompletely protects its farmers from world prices, 
its price transmission elasticity is 0. That means that no 
changes in world pri ces are transmitted to domestic producers. 
If producers receive the world price for their goods, price 
transmis s ion is 1 . Farmer s would see 100% of world price 
changes. This is called full price transmission. Most 
countries are somewhere in the middle, allowing partial pri ce 
transmission to their producers . With little or no price 
transmission, go ve rnments in developing countries could 
receive a windfall from export taxes after liberalization from 
the higher world prices, but the benefits of higher pri ces 
would never be realized. With a 50% to 100% pri ce 
transmission, rural incomes would ri se and produ ction would 
increase. The agri c ultural sectors in the d eve loping 
countries would grow . Again, with o pen -market prices , there 
would be a more efficient allocation of resources. 
There would al so be a redistribution of income from 
consumers to produce rs . As mentioned before, consumers in 
1 6 
LDCs benefit from low producer prices because they keep food 
prices low. The distortions measured by Krueger, Schiff and 
Valdes would be eased by allowing producers in developing 
countries to receive the higher world prices. Moreover , this 
growth in ·the rural sector acts as a c atalyst for the 
development of the rest of the economy. 
However, there are also some costs involved with 
liberalization. Food importing countries will face higher 
food costs. There is concern that the higher world prices 
associated with trade liberalization may lead to i ncreased 
hunger in some co untri es. Also, farmers in developing nations 
could face increased pri ce variability. Although domestic 
policies in developing countries do not help farmers, they do 
protect them from the uncertaint y of world commodity prices. 
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ANALYSIS OF STUD I ES 
Many studies hav e been don e to try to d e t e rmin e t h e 
effe c ts of agricultural trade liberalizati o n on pri ce , 
production, trade and welfar e . While general tr e nds emerge, 
the a c tual results of the studies vary considerably. For 
example, if the OECD co untries liberalize their farm policies, 
world wheat prices will increase. Howe ve r, the increase 
varies between 3.5% and 27% depending on the s tudy used. 
The purpose of thi s sec tion will be to compare , contrast 
and analyze five multi -commodity, partial e quilibrium models 
in order to determine mor e c onc lusivel y the effects of 
agri c ultural trade lib e ralization on the less de ve loped 
countries. 
The s tudies c hosen are all partial equilibrium mod els in 
the sense that they fo cus on the agricultural sec tor of th e 
economy. Th ey are multi -co untry and multi - commodit y models. 
Th e first i s one by Vernon 0. Ron ingen and Prav een M. 
Dixit publi s h e d in 1989. Their model is ca ll e d th e Stati c 
World Policy Simulati on (SWOPSIM ), and is used b y th e USDA. 
It is a static, int e rmed i a t e run mode l that focuses primaril y 
on the r es ult s of agri cul tural libe rali za ti on by the 
industrialized countries. 
The seco nd study is by Barry Krissoff, John Sullivan, 
John Wainio and Brian John s ton publi s hed in 1990. They use 
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the SWOPSIM model o f Ro ning e n and Dixit but include mo r e 
dev e loping co untri es . Th ey run th e model usi ng both full and 
partial pri ce transmi ssion equations for th e LDCs and l ook at 
what happen s when both the d eve l o pe d and the d eve loping 
countries remove their agri c ultural policies. 
The third model is by Kym Anderson and Rod Tye rs, al so 
publish e d in 1990 . This mod e l has both a s tati c and dynamic 
version and both short- a nd long - run r es ult s. This is the 
only model that do es not use produc er and c onsumer s ubsidy 
e quival e nts t o det ermin e protection. Ins t e ad, protection i s 
endogenous, det e rmined by pri ce transmission equations f or 
each countr y . Al so, Tyers and Anderson specifica ll y 
inco rporated the U.S . land se t aside program into their mod e l . 
This will r es ult in a smaller s uppl y contract i o n wh en U.S . 
agri c ultural poli c ies are lif ted . 
Fourth, is a s tudy by Joac him Zietz and Alberto Valdes, 
1989 . Thi s i s a long - run, s tati c model. "Th e model is close 
in spirit to that t o Tye r s and Anderson a nd also Roningen et 
l .. 5 a . It does , however, separate the demand for grains int o 
that for livestock produc tion and grain for food. Zietz and 
5 . Joa c him Zietz and Albe rt o Valdes, "I nt e rnatio nal 
Intera c tions in Food and Agricultural Po li c i es : Eff ec t s of 
Al ternativ e Polic ies," in Afl.ricultural Trad e Liberalization: 
Impli cation s f o r Deve lopi ng Co untri es, ed . Ian Goldin and Odin 
Kn u d s en ( Par i s : OE CD , l 9 9 0 ) , 7 8 . 
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Valdes also run their model with varying amounts of protection 
removed (10%, 50% and 100%). 
The last model is the OECD- MTM (Ministerial Trade 
Mandate) model. This model is a medium- term model and only 
removes 10% of agricultural protection . It also separates 
livestock production demand and food demand in determining 
demand for feed grain. 
As one can see, while these models all try to determine 
the effects of agricultural liberalization on pri c e s and 
output, there are some significant differences among them. 
Table 4 shows a brief surrunary of some of the characteristics 
of each model. 
Looking just at the base year prices used in each model, 
one can see that the results will be dissimilar. Using world 
prices published by the Food and Agriculture Organization of 
the U.N., the base year chosen can explain some of the 
differences in the results of the models. Table 5 shows the 
world prices for certain conmodities during the base years of 
the different s tudies . The prices vary quite dramatically 
depending on the year chosen. 
Another difference in the models is what they use as 
their reference case. The USDA SWOPSIM model used by Roningen 
and Dixit and Krissoff et al. t is "an intermediate static 
20 
Table 4 . Surrrnary of studies. 
R&D K et al. 
base year 
type 
countri es / 
country 
86 - 8 7 
static 
5 yrs . 
86 
s tatic 
groups 11 36 
conmodities 22 22 
price 
trans mi ss ion 0 .5 0 . 5 & 1 
protection PSE / CSE PSE/ CSE 
LDC removal 
of no yes 
protec tion 
Tabl e 5. World pri ces for various 
Tye rs & Zie tz & 
Anderson Valdes 
$ / MT 
80 - 82 8 1- 83 
wh ea t 16 7 165 
co rn 12 2 126 
ri ce 404 352 
soybea n s 276 271 
beef 1456 1350 
s ugar, raw 396 247 
Sour ce : FAO, Quart e rl y Bull e tin of 
T&A Z&V OECD 
80 - 82 
s tati c 
& 
d ynami c 
15 yrs. 
81 - 83 
sta ti c 
20 yrs. 
82 - 85 
stati c 
5 y r s . 
30 22 2 0 
7 6 19 
varies full full 
e nd . PSE / CSE PSE/ CSE 
yes y es yes 
base yea r s . 
OECD- MTM Kri sso ff, 
Roningen & 
Dix it 
82 - 85 86 - 87 
15 3 1 1 5 
124 82 
260 220 
258 212 
1280 1362 
144 l 4 l 
Statistics . 
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model that represents world agricultural mark ets for a given 
year". 6 That is, using 1986 as their base year, the y remove 
all agricultural supports and look at what would happ e n if 
there had been no protection that year. The results from 
their model are compared to 1986 levels of supply and demand. 
"Output from the exercises indicate what might have happened 
if trade distorting support did not exist in 1986 and if all 
other exogenous variables pertinent to agricultural market s 
remained the same." 7 
This is different than the models of Tye rs and Anderson 
and Zietz and Valdes. In their models, supply, demand, price s 
and trade are forecasted for twenty years in Zietz and Valdes 
and fifteen years in Tyer s and Anderson, assuming agricultural 
policies remain consistent. This is considered their base line 
or reference case . The supports are then removed or phased 
out and the model is run again. The results of the studies 
are the differences between the baseline case and the run with 
supports removed. Thus, the base year plays a different role 
than it does in the SWOPSIM models . 
6. Vernon 0. Roningen and Pravee n M 
Implications of Agricultural Policy Reforms in 
Econ om i es . (Wash i n g ton , D . C . : US DA , l 9 8 9 ) , 7 . 
Dixit, Economi c 
Industrial Market 
7. Barr y Krissoff, John Sullivan, John Wainio, Brian 
and Developing Johnston, 
Countries 
Agricultural Trade Libe ralization 
(Washington, D.C . : USDA, 1990), 5. 
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Four out of the five studies use producer subsidy 
equivalents (PSEs) and consumer subsidy equivalents (CSEs) to 
model protection. Roningen and Dixit and Krissoff et al. use 
USDA estimates while Zietz and Valdes and the OECD model use 
OECD estimates for the industrialized countries. PSE and CSE 
e s timates for the developing countri e s come from a variet y of 
sources . Again, variations in the results can be e x p ec ted 
because of the differences in PSEs and CSEs. Tables 6 and 7 
show the different consumer and produc er subsid y equivalent s 
used in the models. 
Table 6 . Consumer Subsidy Equivalents 
country USDA (86 / 87) OECD (1987) OECD (79-86) 
U.S. - 8 - 24 -19 
Canada -15 - 32 - 24 
EC - 17 - 47 - 30 
Japan - 35 -54 - 39 
Australia 0 - 10 - 7 
New Zealand 0 - 8 - 10 
Average - 17 - 42 -28 
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Table 7. Producer Subsidy Equivalents 
country USDA (86 / 87) OECD (1987) OECD ( 79-·86) 
U.S. 26 41 28 
Canada 27 49 32 
EC 33 49 37 
Japan 66 76 66 
Australia 12 1 1 12 
New Zealand 10 14 25 
Average 35 50 37 
As previously mentioned, Tye rs and Anderson do not use 
PSE/ CSE estimates. Rather, "policies affecting domestic 
prices are incorporated via econometrically estimated price 
transmission equations for each country and commodit y. These 
equations capture both the protection and the stabilization 
components of food price and trade policies".8 
One additional aspect of the Tyers and Anderson study 
must be noted. Tyer s and Anderson tr y t o show increased 
produc tion from higher prices two ways . First, the y have 
price - independent farm producti vity growth whi c h · is 
8 . Kym Anderson and Rod Tyers, "How Developing Countries 
Could Cain from Agricultural Trade Liberalization in the Uruguay 
Round," in Agricultural Trade Liberalization: Implications for 
Developing Countries, ed. Ian Goldin and Odin Knudsen (Paris: 
OECD, 1990), 49 . 
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exogenously d e t e rmined . Second, they have produ c tivity growth 
dependent upon pri ce c hange. In th e price-d e pend e nt case, the 
s upply c urve s hift s an extra 5% for eac h 10% inc rease in 
producer prices and vi ce versa for pri ce decreases. As we 
will see, this increase in produ c tion in the developing 
countries moderates the increase in food prices after 
liberalization. This notion of price-dependent growth 
reflects the theory that in the long - run , the supply c urve 
would shift outward, reflecting inc reases in producti v it y due 
to induced technological change and improved efficiencies. 
With higher agricultural pri ces, th e r e is an inducement to 
invest in agricultural resear c h in the LDCs. 
One might think that with the large variations in PSEs 
and CSEs, the differ e nces in base years and varying und e rl yi ng 
assumptions that the r es ult s would b e incomparabl e. Howev e r, 
even with the diff e r e nces in data and mod e ling te c hniqu es, o ne 
sees some s urpri si ngl y similar r es ult s. 
Th e foll owi ng tabl e , tabl e 8, s hows th e r es ult s of the 
s tudie s when jus t th e i ndu s triali zed co untrie s libe rali ze and 
there is onl y partial pri ce trans mi ssion (0.5), in th e 
d eve loping co untri es. As one wo uld ex pe c t, the Roningen and 
Dixit and Krissoff et al. studies hav e ve r y similar results . 
25 
Table 8 . Change s in world pri ces wh e n OECD countri es 
liberali ze with partial pr ice tr ansmi ssio n 
(p e r c ent) 
c onmodit y R & D Kris s off Ty e r s & Ander s on 
independent dep e nd e nt 
wh e at 36 .7 3 7 25 1 9 
c oars e grains 26.3 2 2 3 2 
ri ce 26 . 2 19 18 2 
bee f 21 19 4 3 39 
sheep 31 
poultr y 1 2 . 4 18 10 8 
pork 14 
dair y 65 . 3 88 95 90 
s ugar 52 . 7 4 8 22 2 7 
s o y be an s 6 . 4 - 2 
aggr egat e 22 2 1 30 28 
Note : Roningen & Di x it and Tye r s & And e r s on use ruminant 
(bee f and s he e pme at) and nonruminant (pork and po ultr y ) mea t 
in their mod e ls . 
Th e pri ce inc r e a ses ar e ve r y hi g h beca use th e pr od u ce r s 
in th e LDCs ar e no t see ing th e full pri ce inc rease and, 
th e r e fore, a r e no t increa s ing th e ir o utpu t t o ma k e up fo r the 
d ec r e a sed s uppl y from th e indu s tri a li ze d countr i e s . 
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The Tyer s and Anderson study also s hows large price 
increases, except for coarse grains and rice . As will be seen 
throughout the anal ysis, the Tyers and Ander so n s tud y does not 
show large price increases in c oar se grains bec au se of the way 
they mod e led the U.S. se t-asi de program . The y assumed that 
the set-aside and Conservation Rese rve programs wo uld r emain 
and that target pri ces would continue to de c line appr oximat ely 
4% a year from 1990 to 1995, as the y did from 1986 to 1989. 
Therefore , when agri c ultural poli cies are l ibe raliz ed, there 
will not be a drasti c reduction i n U.S. supply . Thu s, 
international prices will not increase as muc h . 
In the Tyers and Anderson pri ce dep en de nt scena ri o, 
pri ces are not a s high because product ion in developing 
c ountries is increasing e no ugh to mak e up for the d ec r eased 
supply from th e industrialized countries. Pri ce increases are 
moderated by this increased suppl y . Thi s price depend e nt 
growth is es pecia ll y evident in rice production. 
Table 9 shows the pri ce c hanges wh en industria l co untri es 
liberalize and d eve loping co untri es allow full pri ce 
transmi ssion to their produ ce r s a nd co nsumer s . Production in 
the LDCs increases, k eep ing prices slightly lower than in the 
previou s case . This i s most evident wh e n on e compar es the 
results from the last table with th ese for the Krissoff et al . 
and Tye r s and Anderson s tudi es . There is a difference of 10 
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Table 9 . Changes in world pri ces wh e n OECD countries 
liberalize with full pri ce transmission 
(percent) 
corrmodity Krissoff Tye rs & Zietz and Valdes OECD 
Anderson 
ind. dep . 100% 5 0% 10% 10% 
wheat 27 10 9 3 . 5 2 0 . 4 - . 31 
coarse 16 2 2 - 2 . 8 - 0 . 7 - 0 . 1 -. 94 
grains 
rice 1 1 5 3 1. 7 0.9 0 .2 . 3 
beef 16 30 24 10 . 5 4 . 9 0 . 9 1. 5 
sheep 25 2 . 1 
poultry 16 6 6 • 5 
pork 12 - . 2 
dair y 81 39 37 3 
sugar 29 7 9 15 7.6 1. 5 2.5 
soybeans - 2 - 4 - 1 . 5 - 0.3 - 1 . 2 
aggregat e 1 6 1 3 1 2 
to 15 p e r centag e point s be tween the two se t s of r es ult s. With 
partial price transmis s ion, aggregate pri ces in c rease 21 to 
30% wher e a s with full pri ce transmission the in c rea se i s on l y 
12 to 16%. 
Whil e th e r es ult s from Kri sso ff et al. and Ty e rs and 
Anderson are s imilar, there are some differences. Looking at 
dairy pri ces und e r pa rti a l transmi ss i o n , Kri ssof f e t al. ha ve 
pri ces rising 88% and Tye r s and Ander so n s how inc r eases of 90 
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to 95%. However, when one looks at dairy prices when there is 
full transmission, Krissoff et al. still has prices rising by 
81% while Tyers and Anderson show an increase of onl y 37 to 
39%. Tyers and Anderson clearly show developing countries 
significantly increasing their production of dairy products 
while Krissoff et al . do not . 
The results of Zietz and Valdes are quite different than 
those of Krissoff et al. and Tyers and Anderson. In their 
work they note that their results are lower than those of most 
other studies. They explain it this way: 
To explain the fairly large differences in 
predicted world price c hanges among models , one 
has to address the issue of base or reference 
periods . Model predictions are quite sensitive 
to the values of PSEs and CSEs. These values, 
however, can vary considerably over time. 
Hence, the choice of the base period is fairly 
crucial for the model's predictions of world 
price change . 9 
Although the price estimates of Zietz and Valdes are much 
more modest, they are all in the same direction a s the other 
studies. The exception is in the case of coarse grains. I n 
modeling the demand for feed grain, Zietz and Valdes separated 
the demand derived from livestock feed and that derived from 
demand for food. Their findings, showing lower coarse grain 
prices, result from a decline in li ves tock production. 
9. Joachim Zietz and Alberto Valdes, "International 
Interaction in Food and Agricultural Policies," p. 92. 
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As would b e ex pe c ted, th e OECD r es ult s and the Ziet z and 
Vald es es timates when onl y 10% o f prot ec ti o n i s r emov e d are 
s imil a r . 
All studies show a de clin e in the price of so ybe an s . 
Becau se s o y beans are not as h e a v il y pr o t ec t e d a s wh e at , c orn 
and ri ce , ther e would not b e th e dramati c de c rease i n 
produ c tion from a liberalization of agr ic ultural poli c i es. 
Mor eo ve r , farmers would s wit c h from pr odu c ing th e f o rme r l y 
pr o t ec t e d c orrmodities t o produ ci ng soy be an s . Th e r e for e, th e 
s upply of s oybe ans wo uld a c tuall y inc r e a se, c ausing a d ec r eas e 
in their pri c e. Zietz and Va ld es al so not e th e dec r ease i n 
demand for s o ybeans a s lives toc k fe e d. With inc r e a se d s uppl y 
and l e s s d emand, prices will fall. 
Tabl e 10 s hows the we lf a r e e ff ec t s of these pri ce 
c hang es. Krissoff et a l . me a s ur e th e n e t welfare a s th e s um 
of pr odu c e r s urplus, c on s ume r s urplu s , c hange s in go ve rnme nt 
e xp e nditur e and economic r e nt . Tye r s and Ander son 's we l fa r e 
meas ur e al s o has four part s . Th e be n e f i t to cons ume r s i s th e 
e xpect e d Hi c ksian equival e nt variation in inc ome . Pr odu ce r 
ben e f i t i s th e c hange i n produ ce r s urplus . Go ve rnme nt r eve nu e 
i s th e e xpect e d net budg e tary e ff ec t o f trade ta xes and 
s ub s idi es . Lastl y , they inc lud e a s tor age be ne fit whi c h i s 
th e ex p ec t e d in c rease in pr o f it s fr om s to c kholding . Th e ma i n 
diff e r e nce betwee n th e we l f ar e e s timate s o f th e two s tud i es i s 
th ei r d ef inition of co n s ume r ga i n . 
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Table 10. Welfare effects when OECD countries liberalize 
with partial pri ce trans mis sio n ($b{llion s ) 
study producer consumer government net 
welfare welfare s avings welfar e 
Tye rs and Anderson 
IME -122.9 173 . 8 50.9 
LDC 50.4 - 63 . 9 - 13.5 
CP 13.5 - 11. 7 1 . 8 
World - 59 98 .2 39 . 2 
Roningen and Dix it 
IME - 65.6 40.9 6 3. 1 35.3 
LDC 1 7 . 4 - 20.2 - 0 .3 - 4.5 
CP 9.8 - 10. 3 0. 1 - 0.8 
World - 38 . 4 10.4 62.8 29.9 
Kri sso ff et al. 
IME - 66 . 1 39 . 9 58.5 32.3 
LDC 16 . 4 - 19.6 - l . 3 - 4.5 
CP 9.4 - 9 .9 - 0.6 - 1 • 1 
World - 40.4 10.5 56 . 7 26. 8 
IME = Industrial Mark e t Economy , LDC = Less De velope d Co untr y, 
CP = Centrally Plann e d economy. 
Note: Tyer s and Ander so n do not separat e c on s umer we lf a r e and 
government s aving s . 
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These estimates show that produce r s in industrial market 
economies (IMEs) lose while produ ce rs in l ess developing 
countries gain . Consumers in developed c ountries gain while 
consumers ·in developing coun trie s lose. Again, all s tudies 
show the same trends in their welfar e analysis but their 
actual numbers vary. 
When there i s only partial pri ce transmission, total 
welfare is improve d by $27 to $39 billion. But the d eve l oping 
c ountries show a ne t welfare loss of anywhere between $4.5 and 
$13.5 billion . These kinds of re s ult s have been frightening 
to the leader s in developing countries. This is wh y many hav e 
been less than enthusiastic about liberalizing agri c ultural 
policies . 
When Tye rs and Anderson and Kri sso ff et al. allow full 
price transmis s ion, th e r esu lt s are surprisingly similar t o 
those with partial pri ce transmi ssion with o ne notabl e 
exce ption. These results ar e s hown in table 11. 
Tyer s and Anderson show that with full pri ce transmission 
consumers in developing countries lose far less than with only 
partial pri ce trans mi ssion. On e reas o n i s because world 
pri ces do not increase as mu c h with full pri ce transmi ssion. 
Thi s smaller consumer loss together with the expected larg e r 
producer gain gives deve loping co untri es a net welfar e gain of 
$11.5 billi o n . 
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Table 11 . Welfare effect s when OECD countries liberalize 
with full price trans mis s ion ($billions) 
study producer c ons umer government net 
welfare welfare savings welfare 
Tye rs and Anderson 
IME -155.6 202.2 4 .5 5 1 . 1 
LDC 59.7 - 45.9 - 2 . 3 1 1 . 5 
CP 8.4 6 . 0 - 12 2 . 4 
World - 87.5 162.3 - 9 . 8 65 
Krissoff et al. 
IME - 74 48.7 58 . 4 3 3. t 
LDC 25.3 - 30.2 0.5 - 4. 3 
CP 7 . 4 7.8 - 0.4 - 0 .8 
World - 41 . 2 10.8 58.5 28. t 
This result is markedly different from that of Krissoff 
e t al. With full pri ce transmi ss ion, Krissoff et al. show an 
increase in both producer gain and consumer loss. These 
c hang es offset each other and the net result is basi call y 
unc hanged from that with partial transmission . 
Krissoff et al . explain that with full pri ce transmission 
the entire price c hange is seen by consumers and producers. 
Thus, even though world prices don't increase as mu ch with 
full pri ce trans mi ss ion (16% vs. 21%), co nsumer s are seeing 
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the entir e in c rea s e ins tead of ju s t ha lf of it. Und e r partial 
pri ce trans mi ss i o n , con s umer s and produ ce r s in dev e loping 
countrie s would see abo ut a 10.5% inc r e a se in agri c ultural 
pri c es. Wherea s under full transmi ss i o n , they exp e ri e nce a 16% 
increas e . 
In the Krissoff et al. s imulations, wh e n ju s t the 
industrialized countries l iberalize , an a c r oss th e board pri ce 
trans mi ss ion of 0 .5 i s used to e s timate pa rtial tr a ns mi ss i on 
and 1 i s used f o r full transmi ss i on. Th e ir r es ult s ar e ve r y 
synvnetri cal. Comparing the c ons ume r a nd produ ce r we l f ar e 
es timate s wh e n th e y go from partial pri ce transmi ss i o n t o f ull 
pri c e trans mis s i o n, on e find s that pr oduc e r welfare inc r e a ses 
by 5 4% and c onsumer we lfar e de c r e ases by 54%. Thi s l e a ves th e 
ne t we l far e virtuall y un c hang e d b e twe e n th e two scena ri os . 
Tyer s and And e r s on use d omes ti c - t o - bo rd e r pri ce rati os t o 
anal yze di s tortions in co ns ume r and pr odu cer pr i c es. They 
a l so t a k e int o acco un t th e indi rec t e ff ec t s o f ove r valu ed 
excha ng e rat es and indu s trial pr o t ec ti o n pol i c ies a s esti ma t ed 
by Krueg e r, Sc hiff a nd Vald es . Tabl e 12 s hows th e domestic -
to - bo rd e r pr ice rati os used by Tye r s a nd And e r so n . Und e r ful l 
pri ce tran smi ss ion , no t onl y does th e wo rld pri c e inc r eas e by 
o nly 13% ins t e ad o f th e 30% inc r e as e und e r pa rtial pri ce 
trans mi ss i o n, but th e cons ume r pri ce ratios ar e al so l ower i n 
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Table 12. Projected average domesti c- to - border co ns ume r 
price ratios for food pr odu c ts: 1995 
OECD 
Bangladesh 
China 
India 
Indonesia 
South Kor e a 
Pakistan 
Philippines 
Taiwan 
Thailand 
Other Asia 
Argentina 
Brazil 
Mexico 
Other Latin Ameri c a 
Egypt 
Nigeria 
South Africa 
other Sub - Saharan 
Africa 
other N. Africa and 
Middle Ea s t 
Total 
partial pri ce 
transmission 
direct 
and 
direct 
l . 86 
1 . 64 
l • 0 1 
1 • 5 7 
1 • 5 1 
2 . 99 
l . 38 
1 • 55 
l . 39 
1 • 1 4 
1. 27 
. 84 
. 84 
1 . 4 l 
. 90 
1 . 97 
2 . 42 
1 . 40 
I. 36 
2.46 
I. 37 
indir ec t 
l. 86 
1 . 4 I 
.86 
1 . 33 
1. 28 
2.99 
1. 01 
1. 09 
I. 39 
.97 
. 90 
.59 
. 72 
. 99 
.63 
I . 67 
1. 70 
1. I 9 
.96 
2.09 
I . 1 2 
full pric e 
" transmi s sion 
dire c t 
and 
direc t 
l . 7 4 
. 91 
. 95 
1 • 0 l 
I . l 9 
2.36 
1. 07 
1 . 1 5 
1. 38 
l . 0 1 
.83 
.86 
. 90 
I . 22 
l . 0 1 
.95 
l . 88 
l . 23 
. 88 
I . 24 
1 • 04 
indirec t 
l . 7 4 
.78 
.82 
.87 
l . 02 
2.36 
.79 
.80 
I. 38 
.87 
. 59 
. 61 
.77 
.85 
. 7 l 
• 8 1 
l . 32 
1. 05 
.62 
I. 06 
.86 
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most cases. Thus, Tyers and And e r so n s how consumers losing 
less than under partial price transmi ss i o n. 
Another reason for the dis c repancy is the way the s tudi e s 
measure c onsumer welfare. Krissoff et al. use the notion of 
consumer surplus . Tyers and Anderson use the Hicksian 
equivalent variation in income . From microeconomics we know 
that consumer surplus me a s ures are gr~ater than or eq ual to 
equivalent variation measures wh e n there i s a pri ce in crease. 
Thus, Krissoff et al. have consumers losing a greater amount 
than Tyers and Anderson because of their measure of cons ume r 
welfare. 
Therefore, the difference in results stems fr om several 
factors . Tyers and Anderson use countr y-s pecific pri ce 
transmission equations and they use equivalent variation as 
their measure of consumer welfare . It would seem that th e 
results from these two studies co uld be considered upper and 
lower boundaries for the welfare effects of liberalizati on. 
We will now look at what happ e ns to pri ces, produ c tion 
and welfare when both developed and developing countrie s 
liberalize. 
At first glance, ther e appears to be no consens us about 
the effe c ts of global liberalization on food prices. But, in 
fa c t, th e re i s. As has bee n noted, Kri sso ff et al. do not 
take into account the indirect effects on co nsumer and 
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producer prices of non - agricultural poli cies. Tyers and 
Anderson have run two simulations here. One looks at when 
OECB countries and developing countries have liberalized food 
policies . The other has not only food policy liberalized but 
the non-food policies in the LDCs that have been shown to 
affect agricultural prices . Zietz and Valdes include these 
indirect distortions in their model also. Thus , one can look 
at global liberalization in two parts. The first being global 
liberalization with the developing countries removing poli cies 
directly affecting the agricultural sector and the second 
being global liberalization with the developing countries 
removing both the direct and indirect policies affecting 
agricultural prices . 
Table 13 shows the results from the studies that removed 
only direct agricultural policies. Generally , if we focu s on 
the results of Krissoff et al. and the Tyers and Anderson 
price independent run, there is a clear pattern. Except in 
the cases of rice and non - ruminant meat, both studies have 
prices increasing and both show an aggregate increase of 16%. 
Table 14 shows the estimates from the models that removed 
both direc t agricultural policies and indirect macroeconomi c 
disincentives. As can be seen, the Tyers and Ande r son model 
used both scenarios . 
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Table l 3. Global libera lizati on of direct agricultural 
poli cies 
Kri sso ff Tye rs & Anderson OECD 
e t a 1 . ind. dep . 10% 
wheat 20 1 5 1 - 0.7 
coarse grains l 5 5 5 - 1 . 2 
rice 15 6 -27 - 0.6 
beef l 1 24 4 0 
sheep 21 1 . 4 
poultry 1 6 - 2 - 12 0 . 5 
pork 1 1 -1 . 2 
dair y 81 80 66 2.8 
s ugar 40 5 - 10 0 . 6 
soybeans - 3 - 1 . 5 
aggregate 16 16 
Looking at the results of Zie t z and Va ldes and Tyers and 
Anderson in Table 14, o n e also sees a pattern but in the 
opposite dire c tion . Here, the price of almost every corrvnodit y 
falls. The only ex c eptions are beef and dairy. Mor e ov e r, 
Tyers and Anderson show an aggregate pric e c hange of either 0 
o r - 3. 
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Table 14. Global liberalization of direct and indirect 
policies 
Tyers & Anderson Zietz & 
Valdes 
-1 1 . 7 
price- ind . price-dep . 
wheat 1 1 
coarse grains - 24.4 8 7 
rice -21.l -21 -25 
beef 1 3 . 3 8 - 2 
sheep 
poultry - 12 - 17 
pork 
dairy 60 56 
sugar 0 . 8 - 12 - 19 
soy bean s -15.9 
aggregate 0 - 3 
These vastly different result s are directly co rrelated to 
how much liberalization is taking place in the less developed 
countries. If a countr y eliminates the policies directly 
affecting agricultural prices, production in th e LDCs 
increases, but not enough to offset the decrease in su pply 
from the industrialized countries. Food prices increase. 
However , if a countr y liberalizes its agricultural policies, 
adjusts its exc h ange rate a nd e liminates its discriminatory 
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industrial policies, farmer s in developing countries would 
increase their production enough to lower food prices . 
The large negative protection rates 
accorded to agriculture in developing 
countries are predicted to have a more 
significant effect on world prices than 
protection in industrialized co untries 
Overall, the strong world market effect of 
incentive structures of developing 
countries that are unfavorable to their 
agricultural produ c tion may well be the 
biggest s urpri se of this st ud y . 10 
Both of these studies used the work or Krueger, Schiff 
and Valdes in estimating the indir ec t effec ts of other 
policies on agricultural prices. 
Thus, what will happen to agricultural prices i s really 
determined by the policy changes of the less developed 
countries. If they do nothing while the OECD countri e s 
liberalize their policies, prices will rise, producer s in 
developing countries will gain but not enough to offset the 
co nsumer losses. Even with full price transmission, th ere is 
a question of wheth er producer gains would outweigh consumer 
losses. 
In looking at the changes in welfare with both OECD and 
developing countries liberalizing, shown in table 15, one sees 
a net welfa re gain for LDCs wh et her they just eliminate 
10. Joa c him Zietz and Alberto Valdes,"International 
Interactions in Food and Agricultural Policies," p.93. 
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agricultural policies or wh e n they remove all distortion . Th e 
diff e r e nce is the size of the b enefit . 
Table 1 5. Welfare effects of global liberalization 
$ billions produc er consumer government ne t 
welfare welfare savings we lfar e 
Kri ssoff et al. 
(direct) 
OECD - 76.2 50.5 59 33.2 
LDC 18. 9 - 17.5 l. 2 2 . 6 
CP 7.2 - 7 . 5 - 0 . 4 - 0 . 7 
World - 50 . 1 25.5 59.8 35 . 1 
Tye rs & Anderson 
(direct and 
indirect) 
OECD - 193.9 250 4.9 61 
LDC 79.7 - 20.7 - 2.7 56 .3 
CP 4 . 2 2.5 1 . 3 3 
World - 1 10 226 . 8 3 . 5 120.3 
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EFFECTS OF LIBERALIZATION ON DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
The extent to which liberalization of international 
agricultural markets would be beneficial to Sub -
Saharan Africa and other low income food deficit 
countries is generating an intense debate. Indeed , 
the reopening of the debate on poverty and famine, 
partly stimulated by A.K. Sen's work in the early 
1980s, has emphasized the complexity of the 
relationship between the price of f oo d and hunger. 
Briefly stated, it is not clear that a long -te rm 
decline in the world price of food will necessarily 
benefit all the hungry or even the majority of them. 
Kanbur conments that a de c rease in the pri ce of food 
benefits net buyers at the expense of net se llers. 
But the hungry consist of both net sellers an net 
buyers of food . Added to this is the complication 
that many of the net buyers of food rel y on net 
sellers of food for employment. Thus the overall 
outcome of a decline in food prices in t e rms of 
aggregate poverty will dep e nd on how poverty is 
distributed between net food sellers and bu ye rs. 11 
As the above quotation indicates, the effect of trad e 
liberalization on les s develope d countries is not altog e ther 
clear. While the models give us a great deal of information 
about liberalization, there are some weaknesses. 
11. Catherine Moreddu, Ke v in Parris and Bruce Huff, 
"Agricultural Policies in Developing Countries and 
Agricultural Trade" in Agricultural Trade Liberalization: 
Implications for Developing Co untrie s ed . Ian Go ldin and Odin 
Knudsen (Paris: OECD, 1990) 123. Citing S.M. Kanbur,"Global 
Food Balances and Individual Hung e r: Three Themes in an 
Entitlements Bas e d Approa c h," Warwi c k Economic Research Papers 
227 (Coventry : University of Warwi ck, April 1987). 
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First , the mod e l s do not include tropical agricultural 
produc ts. Even without these goods, estimates for change in 
net trade by Krissoff e t al., (table 16) , and c hanges in net 
foreign exchange earnings by Tyer s and Anderson, (table 17), 
show the less developed countries coming out ahead after any 
kind of liberalization. 
Table I 6. Change in net trade $billions 
Krissoff OECD OECD global 
et al. liberalization, liberalization , 
partial pri ce full price 
transmi ssion transmis sion 
OECD 7 . 7 - 13 . 6 - 1 6 . 2 
LDC 5.4 l 1 • 6 14.3 
CP 2.3 2 1 • 9 
Table 17. Change in net foreign exchange earnings 
$billions 
Tyers and 
Anderson 
OECD 
LDC 
CP 
World 
OECD 
liberalization, 
full pri ce 
transmission 
- 113.2 
79.2 
7.4 
- 26.6 
global 
(direct and 
indirect) 
-143.6 
104.2 
12.4 
- 27 
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In short, the focus on traditional temperate -zone 
agricultural produ c t s may seriously underestimate 
the long - run gains to developing countries following 
an export-oriented policy when there is lower 
protection in agricultural products in OECD 
countries.12 
There is another important weakness in these studies. 
The developing countries are all lumped together. There is no 
distinction between developing countries that are agricultural 
exporters and those that are not . Developing countries are a 
diverse group. To put them all together leaves many questions 
concerning the effects of liberalization on individual 
count ri es left unanswered . 
Even studies such as the one done by Krissoff et al . , 
that tried to analyze country and country groups 
independently, found too little information on many countries 
to adequatel y mod e l them. For ex amp l e , for A f r i ca and th e 
Middle East, the co untries of Egypt, Nigeria and Kenya are the 
only ones specifically modeled. Mo r e o v er , i n f o r ma t i on on 
agricultura l support poli c ies wa s availab l e f o r only Nigeria 
and Egypt. Thus, the results are very general. 
Also, becaus e th e model s are static, th ey don't s ho w th e 
route of c hang e. It would be useful for tho se in the 
12. Zietz and Valdes,"International In teractions in Food 
and Agricultura l Poli cies ," p .94. 
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developing countrie s to see how these changes will take place; 
the movement of re sources, the c hang es in prices over time and 
th e s uppl y and demand re s pons es. Th is information would not 
only show them the specific changes that would occur but it 
would allow them to moderate some of the more painful 
adjustme nts . 
These ar e areas in which additional work needs to be 
done . However, that is not to impl y that c hang e should wa i t . 
Th e future without liberalization is bleak for the d eve loping 
c ountries . In an art i cle by Bruna Angel a nd S.R. Johnson, the 
production and consumption of agricultural products is 
fore cast ed. Taking into c onsid er ation th e larg e population 
growth rates of the se countries, th e limit e d pr o ducti on du e in 
part to low agricultural prices and th e s low income growth 
expected in developing cou ntries, th ey found p e r ca p i ta 
consumption de c lining in the 1990s. 
For many of th e countries in Africa, the Mi ddle 
East , and Latin America th e d ec lin e in food use per 
capita from alr eady low l eve l s is alarming. Th e 
food situation for these di sad va ntag ed populati ons 
ha s not imp ro ved in th e l ast 10 yea r s andi based o n 
th e outlook, it is likel y t o d e t e riorate. 3 
Estimate s b y Zietz and Valdes a nd Tyers and And e r s on on 
self - sufficiency with and without libe ralization in table 18 
13. Bruna Angel and S .R . John so n , "Changing 
Int e rnat ional Food Mark e t s in th e 1990s : Impli ca tions for 
De veloping Cou ntri es" in World Food Trade and Aid in the 199 0s 
e d . L . F 1 e t c h e r ( for th com i n g ) 6 2 . 
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show the importance of some form of lifting of policies for 
the developing countries. The estimates of Zietz and Valdes 
are significantly less optimisti c than those of Tyers and 
Anderson. However , both studies recognize the improvement in 
foreign exchange earnings for LDCs after liberalization , which 
would allow increased purchases of food. 
Table 18 ~ Self-sufficiency estimates 
Tye rs and Anderson reference OECD 1 i b . with full global 
pri ce transm ission 
OECD 109 83 74 
LDC 92 1 1 1 1 1 8 
Zietz and Valdes 
(cereals) 
OECD 1 37 136 134 
LDC 82 82 84 
Zietz and Valdes also estimate the cereal import needs of 
developing countries under different liberalization scenarios, 
(table 19). The actual amount of imported cereal de c reases 
for every region except Sub - Saharan Africa and Latin America, 
where it increased slightly. The cereal import bill decrea ses 
for all regions except Latin America . Th e greatest change 
c omes in Asia where cereal export earnings are expected to be 
greater than the costs of ce real imports. 
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Tabl e 1 9. Ce r e al import n eed s by deve l op ing co untr y r egio ns 
Zietz and all Asia N. Afri c a Sub- Sah. Latin 
Valdes LDCs / Middle Afri c a Ame ri ca 
East 
BASELINE 
import l e ve l 173 30 86 44 1 2 
(million tons ) 
cereal import 174 29 14 3 350 293 
bi 11 (%change) 
OECD 
LIBERALIZE 
import l evel l 7 1 29 85 4 5 1 3 
(million t o ns) 
ce r ea l import 157 - 56 137 352 287 
bi 11 (%c hang e) 
ALL LIBERALI ZE 
import l ev el 156 10 8 1 49 1 4 
(million ton s) 
ce r ea l import 93 - 267 81 323 383 
bi 11 (%c hang e ) 
All of th ese es timate s indi cate a b e n e fit t o th e 
de ve loping c ountri es fr om trade lib e rali za ti on. Th e a c tual 
r es ult s, how eve r , d e pend on what th e deve l op ing co untri es do 
wit h th e ir own d omestic poli c i es. All of th e scenari os have 
th e indu s trializ e d countri es libe ralizing. The diff e rences 
bet wee n th e run s are th e pri ce t r an smi ss i on equat io ns and 
wh e th e r ju s t th e dir ec t or both th e dir ec t and indir ect 
po li c i es ar e r emoved . 
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The following table, table 20, i s a s urrmar y of the 
result s discussed earlie r. Ju s t l ooking at the Tyers and 
Anderson results, one c an see how important the poli cies o f 
the developing countries are. Using the same mod e l , the 
aggregate price of agricultural goods will vary by 30% 
depending on the a c tion tak e n by th e LDCs. 
varies by almost $70 billion . 
Their net we lfare 
An issue s ometime s pas sed ov e r i s that of eco nomi c 
efficiency. When farmers receive pri ces higher than th e 
mark e t pri ce , more output is produ ced than wo uld hav e been had 
mark et prices prevailed. Thus, more re s our ces are drawn in to 
agriculture. If open market pri ces are used , some of t hose 
reso ur ces would leave the f arm sector and be used in other 
sectors of the economy. Some of thi s gain in ef fi c iency s ho ws 
up in the net welfare gains of liberalization. Krissoff e t 
al. point out that ther e i s a $7 billion gain in efficiency 
when there i s global liberalization. Tye r s and Anderson's 
es timates would be e ven larger. Arguing th e merits o f 
liberalization on the basi s of economic e ffi c i e n cy and 
comparativ e advantag e ma y not win many conv er t s; but talking 
about gains ranging from $ 7 to $70 bill io n pr o babl y will. 
It must be c autione d that with partial e quilibrium 
model s, the e ffi ciencies gained in th e r est of the economy 
cannot be mea s ur e d. Ho weve r , it is possib l e that wh i l e 
agricultural pri ces would inc rease due to OECD libe ralization, 
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with a more efficient allocation of resour ces , pri ces of other 
goods exported from industrialized countries would be cheaper. 
Any ·examination of those issues requires a general equilibrium 
model. 
Table 20. Sunmary of changes in prices and welfare from 
agricultural liberalization . 
OECD LIBERALIZE 
Partial Price 
Transmission 
aggregate prices 
change in welfare 
Fu11 Price 
Transmission 
aggregate prices 
chang e in welfare 
ALL LIBERALIZE 
Direct Policies 
aggregate pri ces 
change in welfar e 
Direc t and 
Indirect Poli c ies 
aggregate prices 
change in welfare 
Krissoff et al. 
21% 
-$ 4 . 5 billion 
16% 
-$4.3 billion 
16% 
$2 .6 billion 
Tyers and Anderson 
independent dependent 
30% 28% 
- $13 . 5 billion 
13% 12% 
$11.5 billion 
16% 1 % 
$29 billion 
0% - 3% 
$56.3 billion 
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CONCLUSION 
It has long been as s ume d that th e agri c ultural s e c tor s in 
devel oping countrie s are no t fav o r e d a s th ey are in th e 
indus triali zed c ountri es. The ex tent o f th e di s incenti ves 
fa ced b y farmer s in LDCs wa s recentl y e xplored by Kru ege r , 
Sc hiff and Valdes. Th e ir r es ult s s howe d a situati o n wo r se 
than pr e viou s ly thought. 
Su c h low ag ri c ultur a l pri ces hind e r d eve lopme nt i n 
developing countries . Man y e co nomi s t s now believe that th e 
agri c ultural s ector is vital to th e developme nt of th e r es t o f 
the e conomy. However , low f oo d pri ces ar e foreca s t ed t o 
continu e into the ne xt century. 
On e proposed wa y t o h e lp a g ri c ultur e in d eve l o p i ng 
countri es i s t o op e n th e prot ec t e d ma rk e t s o f th e 
industriali ze d c ountri es . Howe ve r , r es ult s from mo d e l s 
l ooking at agri c ultur a l libe rali za ti o n we r e co ntradi c tor y and 
confu s ing. 
What we now kno w i s that th e ef f ec t s of trade 
libe ralization on d e ve l oping countri es d e p e nds on what th e 
LDCs d o in th e ir own eco nomi es . If th e po li c i es o f impo rt 
s ub s tituti o n and indu s trial pr o t e c ti o n ar e k e pt, f ood pr i c es 
inc r ease a nd ove r a ll we lfa r e will de c r ease . Ho weve r , i f f ull 
pri ce trans mi ss i o n i s all o we d and ha rmful ma c r oeco nomic 
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poli c i es ar e dismantled , th e farm sec t o r s in d eveloping 
countri e s will produ ce e nough t o o ff set th e s uppl y reduction 
from th e d e ve loped nations. 
This increase in domesti c produ c tion increas es incomes i n 
the rural sector. Thi s re s ult s in inc reased demand for 
agricultural and other goods. Th e d eve l o pme nt o f th e rural 
sector act s a s a catal ys t f o r economic growth in the othe r 
sectors. There is al s o a redistribution of income fr om th e 
urban consumers to the rural produce r s. Ther e will be an 
inc r e a se in net trade and an increase in net we lfare. 
One must rememb e r that lower food pri ces b ecau se of 
increased produc tion in th e dev e loping c ountri es is much 
different than lower agri c ultural prices because of a 
continuation of current poli c ies . With libe ralization comes 
improved economic effi c iency, increased self - s uffi cien cy of 
LDCs, bett e r di s tribution of income, inc reased government 
s avings and an inc rease in net we lfar e. 
How confident can we be that th e r esult s projected wo uld 
actually occur aft e r agricultural trade liberalization? Th e r e 
are man y variables that ca use economic for ecasts to go awry. 
How eve r, think ther e are bas i c finding s in whi c h o ne can be 
confid e nt. If prot ectioni st policies in the indus tri a liz ed 
countries are redu ced, meaning th e inf lat e d prices paid for 
ce rtain cro ps wo uld be phased o ut o r e liminat ed , th e s uppl y of 
thos e goods from the d eve l oped countri es wo uld decrease. That 
5 l 
would cause the world price to increase. How much the supply 
would decrease, how much the price would increase, and how 
much the developing countries would increase their output to 
offset the reduced supply from the industrial countries will 
never be known with certainty. 
general guidelines. 
But these studies give us 
The studies discussed in this paper have results which, 
when analyzed, follow a pattern. Perhaps the study which on 
its own shows this is the one by Tyers and Anderson. It uses 
both the direct and indirect effects of domestic policies in 
LDCs. It has both partial and full price transmission 
scenarios. Both exogenous supply shifts and price induced 
shifts are modeled. And it attempts to balance the effects of 
target prices and supply management programs in the U.S. 
A model with so many alternatives reinforces an awarene s s 
of the complexities of predicting the outcome of trade 
liberalization. Although much work has already been done in 
this area, additional work is needed. Zietz and Valdes 
recorIYT1end running their model with the USDA data to see how 
their results compare to the results from the SWOPSIM model. 
There also needs to be better information on the developing 
countries and they need to be disaggregated. More tropical 
agricultural products need to be included to have a better 
understanding of the changes that will occur in the 
agricultural sectors of developing countries. 
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Notwithstanding the need for additional s tudies, the 
developing countries should not fear discussions of 
liberalization by the industrialized countries, nor should 
they feel powerless. Ultimately, as these studies have shown, 
they will determine the results of trade liberalization by 
their own actions. 
53 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Anderson, Kym, and Rod Tye rs. "How Deve loping Countries Co uld 
Gain from Agri c ultural Trade Liberalization in the 
Uruguay Round." In Agricultural Trad e Libera li za ti on : 
Implications for Developing Countries , e d. Ian Goldin and 
Odin Knudsen, 41 - 75 . Paris: OECD, 1990. 
Angel, Bruna, and S.R. Johnson . "Changing international Food 
Markets in the 1990 s : Impli c ation s for Developing 
Countries." In World Food Trade and Aid in the 1990s , ed. 
L. Fletcher, 43-129 . forth c oming. 
Angel, Bruna, Tom Harrington, W.H. Me ye r s and S .R. Johnson. 
Economic Growth and Agricultural Trade of Less-De vel oped 
Countries: Sunmary Report. Staff Report 89-SR37 . Ames: 
Cent er for Ag r i c u 1tura1 and Rur a 1 Deve 1 opmen t, 198 9. 
Blandford, David, Harr y deGorter, Bruce Gardner, and Da v id 
Harvey . "There is a way to Support Farm Income with 
Minimal Trade Distortions ." Choices (First Quart e r , 
1989): 20 - 21, 24-25. 
Breimyer, Harold F. "The Farmer's Split Per sonalit y on 
Trade." Challenge 30 (July / August 1987): 
Byerlee, De rek. "The Political Eco nomy o f Third World Food 
Imports: Th e Case of Wheat ." Economic Development and 
Cultural Change 35 (January 1987) : 307 -28 . 
Chri st iansen, Robert E. Th e Impa c t of Economi c De velopme nt on 
Agricultural Trad e Patt er n s . Wa s hington, D.C.: U.S. 
Departme nt of Agriculture, 1987 . 
Clay, Edward J. "Food Assistance: impli ca tions for 
Development and Trade . " ln U. S. Agriculture and Third 
World Development: The Criti ca l Linkag e, e d. Randall 
Purcell and Elizabeth Morri so n , 175 - 2 11 . Boulder: Lynne 
Rienner Publi s he r s, 19 87 . 
Clay , Edward and J ohn Shaw, ed . Povert y , Development and Food: 
Essays in honou r of H.W. Sing e r o n his 75th Birthday. 
London: MacMillan Press, Ltd. , 1987. 
d e Janvr y, Alain and Elisabeth Sadoul et, " Th e Co nditions f or 
Compatibility betwee n Aid and Trade in Agriculture." 
Economic Deve lopme nt and Cultural Cha ng e 37 (October 
198 8 ): 1- 30. 
54 
Fischer, Gunther, Klau s Fr o hb e rg, Mi c hi el Keyzer, and Kirit S . 
Parikh . Linked National Mo d e l s : A Tool for 
International Foo d Poli cy Anal ys i s . Dordrecht: Kluwer 
Ac ad em i c Pub l i s he r s , 1 9 8 8 . 
Fl e tcher, Lehman, ed. World Food Trade and Aid in th e 1990s. 
Boulder: Westview Pr ess, forthcoming. 
Food and Agricultural Po li cy Research In s titute. 1991 World 
Ag ri cultural Outlook. Ames: I owa State Univ e r si t y: 
1 991 . 
Gitt inger, J. Pri ce , J oanne Les li e and Ca r o lin e Ho isingt on, 
e d. Food Policy: Integrating Supply, Di s tribution and 
Consumpti on. Baltimore: Th e Johns Hopkin s University 
Press, 1987. 
Goldi n , Ian and Odin Knudsen, ed. Agri c ultural T r ade 
Liberali za tion: Impli cati o ns for Developing Countries. 
Paris : OECD, 1990. 
Hathaway, Dal e E. Agri c u lture and th e CATT: Rewriting t he 
Rules. Wa shington, D. C . : In s titut e f or International 
Eco nom ics, 1987 . 
Jac ks on , Chri s topher. "Right 
Poli c y 8 (Augu s t 198 3): 
Instinc t s, Wrong Policy . " 
243 - 4 . 
Kri ssoff, Barry, John Su l livan, John Wain io , a nd Brian 
J o hnston. Agricultura l Trade Libe r a li za tion and 
Deve loping Countri es . Wa s hingt on D.C .: U. S. Department 
of Ag r i c ul tu re , 1 9 9 0 . 
Kru eger, Anne 0. , Mauri ce Sc hif f, and Alberto Valdes . 
"Agricu l tu r a l Inc e ntiv es in Deve l o ping Countri es: 
Mea s uring th e Effect of Secto r a l and Eco nomywid e 
Po li cies . " Th e World Bank Economic Rev i e w 2 (Sep temb e r 
1988): 255-71. 
Moreddu, Cat h eri ne, Kevin Parris, a nd Bruce Huff. 
"Agricultural Pol i c i es i n Develop ing Co untri es a nd 
Ag r icu ltural Trade . " In Ag ri c ul t ur a l Trade 
Liberal i za ti on : Impli ca ti ons f o r Deve l op ing Co un tries . 
ed . Ian Go l din a nd Odin Knudsen, 11 5- I57. Paris : OECD, 
1990. 
Organization f or Economic Cooperation and Development. 
Natio nal Po l icies and Agri cu ltur a l Trade. Par is: OECD, 
1987 . 
55 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development . OECD 
Economic Studies: Modelling the Effe c ts of Agricultural 
Policies. Paris: OECD, Winter 1989-90. 
Paarlberg, Robert L . Fixing Farm Trade: Policy Options for 
the United States. Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing Co., 
1 988 . . 
Paarlberg, Robert L. "U .S. Agriculture and the Developing 
World: Opportunities for Joint Gains." In Growth, 
Exports and Jobs in a Changing World Economy: Agenda 
1988, ed·. John W. Sewell and Stuart K. Tucker, 119-38. 
New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1988. 
Parikh, Kirit, Gunther Fischer, Klaus Frohberg, and Odd 
Gulbrandsen. Towards Free Trade in Agri c ultur e. 
Dor d r e ch t : Mar t i nu s N i j ho f f Pub 1 i s h e r s , 1 9 8 8 . 
Purcell, Randall B. and Elizabeth Morrison, ed . ~ 
Agriculture and Third World Development: The Critical 
Linkage . Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publ is·her s, 1987 . 
"The Road Down Subsidy Mountain." The Economist 307 (May 21, 
1988): 15. 
Roningen, Vernon O. and Praveen M. Dixit . Economic 
Implications of Agricultural Policy Reforms in Industrial 
Market Economies. Washington, D.C.: U.S . Department of 
Agriculture, 1989. 
Runge, Carlisle Ford. "The Assault on Agricultural 
Protectionism ." Foreign Affair s 67 (Fall 1988): 13 3-50. 
Sc huch, G. Edward. "Some Neglected Agricultural Poli cy I ss ues 
in th e Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations . " 
In Trade, Aid and Policy Reform: Proceedings of the 
Eighth Agricu lt ure Sector Symposium. ed. Colleen 
Roberts, 5 - 12. Wa s hington , D.C .: World Bank, 1988. 
Sewell, John W. and Stuart K. Tucker, ed. Growth, Exports and 
Job s in a Changing World Economy: Agenda 1988. New 
Brunswick: Transaction Books , 1988. 
Sutton, Joh~ D. Resource Policy Subsidies and the CATT 
Negotiations . Wa s hing t o n , D.C.: U.S. Department of 
Ag r i c ulture , 198 9. 
Tyers, Rodney and Kym Anderson. "Libe rali si ng OECD 
Agricultural Pol ic ies in the Uruguay Round: Effects on 
56 
Trade and Welfare . " Journal of Agricultural Economi_cs 39 
(May 1988): 197 -2 16. 
Valdes, Alberto and Joachim Zietz. "Export Subsidies and 
Minimum Access Guarantees in Agricultural Trade : A 
Developing Country Perspective." World Development 15 
(May 1987): 673-83. 
World Bank. World Development Report 1990. Washington, D.C. : 
World Bank, 1990. 
Zietz, Joachim and Alberto Valdes. "International 
Interactions in Food and Agricultural Policies: Effects 
of Alternative Policies." In Agricultural Trade 
Libe~alization: Implications for Developing Countries. 
ed . Ian Goldin and Odin Knudsen , 77-114. Paris: OECD , 
1990. 
Zietz, Joachim and Alberto Valdes. "The Costs of 
Protectionism to Developing Countries: An Analysis for 
Selected Agricultural Produ c ts ." World Bank Staff 
Working Papers No . 769. Paris: World Bank , 1986 . 
